Abstract
Introduction
This paper 1 focuses on individuals who left the Horn of Africa and began to arrive in growing numbers in England in the 1960s following the decolonisation of the African 2 continent. We pursue a transnational perspective to understand the complex relationship between these immigrants, their country of settlement and their country of origin as this played out in UK-based Refugee Community Organiszations (RCOs).
Our research is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Ethiopian and Eritrean communities in Britain, including RCO"s, and was undertaken between 2007 and 2009.
The central focus of our research was to understand how Ethiopians and Eritreans sought asylum in Britain (Campbell 2013) . In addition to interviewing 30+ asylum seekers and following their cases through the courts, we interviewed staff in twenty seven27
Ethiopian and eleven 11 Eritrean RCOs, undertook in-depth fieldwork in four RCOs, met
and interviewed large numbers of settled Ethiopians and Eritreans, and attended a wide range of social activities, events and, venues, etc. One of the authors is an Ethiopian anthropologist who was also a refugee.
We begin by reviewing relevant literature on immigrant transnationalism. Section
(ii) examines the history of Ethiopian and Eritrean settlement in the UK, the development of RCOs/"community" institutions and integration into British society. Sec. (iii) uses interview material to explore these immigrants" experience of living in the UK and how life here influenced their social identity. We conclude that the effect of restrictive asylum and integration policy together with key elements of the wider social context which Ethiopians and Eritreans confronted as they settled in the UK tended to reinforce social differences -between and among refugees and between refugees and citizens -which created barriers to integration and perpetuated certain types of attachments/connections to their country of origin.
African transnational immigrants
The expanding movement of goods, capital, services, and people across the globe in the 20 th and 21 st century has given rise to a number of pressing political and intellectual questions. One important question concerns the implications of the movement of people across international borders for nation -states and for immigrants: sovereign states seek to exclude unwelcome aliens and assimilate/integrate immigrants, whereas immigrants face hostility and other problems in settling in a host -country and are reluctant to being assimilated.
The connectedness which some immigrants have for their country of origin, as exhibited through participation in diverse types of cross-border "connections", has given rise to questions about how immigrants should be viewed and how their relationship to their host state and their country of origin can best be understood. As Waldinger (2014: 6) has recently reminded us, If international migration is a recurring phenomenon, cross-state social action, whether uncoordinated or concerted, will also reappear. Moreover, the analysis can"t be confined to a "transnational social field" linking movers and stay-athomes in distant and separate locations. That field is embedded in a broader field, made up of state and civil-society actors here and there, who respond in various ways to the challenges and opportunities generated by the cross state flows produced by migration.
In short we need to examine the inter-play overtime between immigrants and their families and friends back home, and the role of states and other actors in strengthening or weakening the connections between a migrant and their host -country and their country of origin. It is useful to differentiate between three types of immigrant, each of which exhibits somewhat different connections to their country of settlement and their country of origin: low-skilled labour migrants (economic migrants who seek to earn money and remit cash home); high-skilled migrants (legally resident here, but ultimately interested in returning home), and refugees and asylum seekers who cannot return home.
Because of geographic distance and the fact that Ethiopia/Eritrea are not members of the British Commonwealth, there has been very little skilled or unskilled labour migration to the UK. There have, however, been relatively large numbers of refugees and asylum applicants from the Horn of Africa coming to the UK. Settlement in the UK has tended to become permanent and has understandably led to a variety of cross-border connections with home, e.g. by sending remittances, visiting, involvement in homeland politics, consuming goods produced at home, communicating with relatives and friends and ultimately assisting individuals to migrate to the UK.
The literature on Ethiopian/Eritrean immigrants illustrates various aspects of their connections to the Horn of Africa. For instance Koser (2007a) has written about Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants and their differential engagement in the politics of their homeland. Koser (2007a, b) is primarily concerned with possible policy initiatives to enhance the way that Eritreans engage with their homeland and with the potential threat of migrant transnationalism to Eritrea.
A similar approach is taken by Lyons in his discussion of the Ethiopian Diaspora in North America and its involvement in politics in Ethiopia (2006 Ethiopia ( , 2008 . In the US there are an estimated 460,000 Ethiopians from among whom a small number of individuals are key players in homeland politics in part because they provide key financial support but also because they frame the conflicts through their control over media outlets and other institutions where political strategies are debated and leaderships and strategies legitimized. (2008: 10) It is important to note, however, that the relationship between Eritrean and Ethiopian immigrants to their homeland differs radically. The Eritrean Diaspora is policed and taxed by the Eritrean government through its embassies and consulates (fieldwork, Human Rights Watch 2009). In contrast, some Ethiopians in the US -who are well organiszed on ethnic and political lines -actively participate in homeland politics and they assist families and communities left behind. A feature common to both populations has been the development of, and variable "participation" in, vibrant on-line "virtual communities" which arguably foster new forms of social belonging and which may link a fractured and geographically dispersed population to one another and their homeland (Bernal 2005; Hafkin 2006 ).
Research on these immigrants has adopted a range of conflicting approaches and definitions. For instance, the work of Koser and Lyons, cited above, is narrowly focused on a specific issue and tends to assume rather than demonstrate the existence of a shared identity/community without examining the historical, lived experience of these immigrants in their country of settlement. Similarly Matsuoka and Sorenson (2001) analyse the construction of identity among Ethiopians and Eritreans in North America.
They argue that the sense of national identity articulated by these individuals is based on nostalgia for stable communities that offer order, security, continuity, In short the assumption in much of the literature is that Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants have a "collective identity" and that they form a "community", but these assumptions are not grounded in empirical research. What is needed is to understand the lived experience of diverse African immigrants in their host country through an openended approach which "transcends the discursive politics" of diaspora based on Anglophone theorisations and a preoccupation with the relation between disapora and nation (Zeleza 2005: 39) . Phrased somewhat differently, we need to understand whether and how the migrant experience in their country of settlement acts "as a kind of pivot which while anchored, pivots between a new land and transnational incorporation" (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004 : 1011 .
Rather than assume certain kinds of connectedness to the homeland, research needs to demonstrate the precise type of connections which develop in a country of settlement, and the changing importance over time which that connections have for the way that individuals engage with their country of settlement and their country of origin.
For instance, the limited research on the experience of immigrants who visit "home"
clearly shows that immigrants are viewed as different by "stay at homes". For instance, MikalWaldu (2014: 35) found that "when second generation Eritrean immigrants returned "home" for the first time and interacted with "locals", youth from the diaspora are "forced"
to renegotiate their identity and their sense of "Eritreaness" due to their perceived lack of fluency in speaking the local language, their dress, and their behaviour".
It is clearly the case, as Waldinger (2013: 760) reminds, us, that "connectivity does not imply collectivity", i.e. that diverse forms of identity and ways of connectingacross immigrant communities as well as between immigrants and their homelands -are possible. He also argues that social identities change more slowly than social connections and that we should expect "home country spill overs" into the country of settlement. In the following sections we adopt this approach to analyse the experience of Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants in the UK. There is no information regarding where many of those who were dispersed currently reside, though anecdotal evidence suggests that many have moved to London and other large cities.
Immigration and settlement in the UK

What types of social connections have Ethiopians and Eritreans forged in Britain,
and what role have these connections played in shaping the politics of life here and there?
In the UK asylum applicants do not have a right to work, to housing, education or to social benefits until after they are granted legal/refugee status, a process which restrictive government policies adopted after 1999 have made increasingly difficult to achieve.
Restrictive policies have contributed to the exclusion of refugees, to racism and to economic marginalization reinforced by an inability to work.
It is in a socio-political context of increasingly restrictive asylum and immigration policy and hostility to migrants that immigrant organizing, the focus of this paper, needs to be understood as a form of "defensive" social capital (Zetter et. al. 2006) . If we step back from looking at individual RCOs, it is clear that the arrival of growing numbers of refugees contributed to the creation of new, and the splitting of existing, RCOs which had a much narrower focus. For instance, RCOs were formed to assist refugees with specific health/social needs, to assist specific ethnic groups and to promote specific political programmes back in The Horn. Furthermore, the growing number of RCOs did not have an organiszation capable of meeting its costs or running its activities, 6 , nor did they have a large membership base.
By 1999 government policy initiatives, including the dispersal of asylum applicants and the cessation of government funding for "community" organiszations, lead to a decline in the number of RCOs. For a variety of reasons, most individuals tend to participate in an RCO on an irregular basis and they contribute little to an organiszation"s finances. The principale exceptions are the Orthodox Churches, one RCO which transformed itself into an organisation that provided services to a larger "African" clientele, and small RCOs whose focus is explicitly cultural/religious. Eritrean cultural associations are small in size and provide a limited range of activities, but their strength lies in drawing their membership either from a specific ethnic group (and eschewing politics) and/or on the basis of a shared language or religion. Thus Arabic, while not a first language, became an important organiszing principle for some groups because conflict in the Horn had dispersed many people into The Gulf and North Africa.
The growth, splitting, and subsequent decline of RCOs also reflects a tendency to organisze along ethnic lines, the organiszational role played by a small elite and, in a hostile environment where funding came from government, a tendency to compete for external resources (and be co-opted by funders; Griffith, Sigona and Zetter 2005: chap.4).
Throughout the 1990s RCOs also encountered difficulties caused by political "spill over" from the Horn. Following Eritrean independence in 1993, the ruling political party has used Eritrean embassies to mobilisze party supporters to police public meetings of immigrants and take over Eritrean RCOs. In the US, this situation contributed to large numbers of Eritreans withdrawing "from secular politics into more autonomous religious organizations where they are able to practice Eritreanness beyond its tortured politicization and offer a different organizing principle for the community" (Heppner 2003: 279) . In the UK, however, with its relatively small population of Eritreans, "an essentially defensive role in an environment of hostile immigration policy" (Zetter et. al. 2006: 11) where the forms of social capital they established increasingly differentiated between individuals on ethnic, religious, and national lines at the expense of creating "bridging" social capital across their perceived differences and with British society.
The British state, and in particular the Home Office, has taken the lead in defining and implementing asylum and integration policy. The Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) and subsequent asylum legislation put into place a policy of deterrence which has made it increasingly difficult for individuals to obtain asylum. First, administrative practices aimed at withdrawing welfare support and the right to work were put on a statutory basis creating a highly stratified system of entitlements which sharply differentiated between the rights of asylum applicants (admitted temporarily while their claim was being assessed), refugees (who were granted status), and individuals granted temporary/humanitarian protection, from failed asylum seekers and economic migrants who were subject to impoverishment and deportation (Dwyer and Brown 2004) . Second, asylum applicants were compulsorily disbursed across England, Wales, and Scotland where support services were largely unavailable and few spoke their language, to await a decision on their claim. Third, the Home Office/UK Border Agency (which refuses between 66 and 88 percent of all initial asylum applications) and the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal which hears appeals against Home Office decisions, were repeatedly restructured compounding the difficulty faced by asylum applicants who sought to appeal against official decisions (Campbell 2013, chaps. 5 & 6) .
Following an inquiry into "civil disturbances" in English cities in 2000, gGovernment policy ended the policy of promoting "multiculturalism" and replaced it with a policy of "community cohesion". The Cantle Report (2001: 9) argued that "Separate: educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives". In short, multi-culturalism had created social segregation which had led to a "lack of contact" between communities which failed to contribute to "a sense of belonging and shared values". As Hepburn (2015) and others have noted, the Cantle recommendations "bled" into UK immigration policy and has resulted in the creation of "coercive integration policies" which compel refugees and immigrants to attend programmes and pass citizenship tests, etc. to demonstrate their respect for UK values. However UK policies on integration/cohesion lack coherence and, in part because responsibility for implementation has been devolved to local authorities, the policy has failed to address the constraints preventing refugees and migrants from integrating.
The factors which constrain immigrants from integrating -and which are not addressed by current UK policy -include the absence of language skills, the failure to recognisze immigrant qualifications, enforced mobility, lack of knowledge about how to access schools and housing, etc., inadequate specialist services, legal barriers preventing a timely decision on asylum application, and public hostility (Spencer 2005) . Indeed these social and policy constraints are partly responsible for the insular nature of RCOs and their inability to develop "bridging capital" with local communities with whom they are now expected to integrate. To the extent that RCOs created parallel lives for Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants, current policies on "social cohesion" which put the responsibility on immigrants to integrate, will not succeed. Instead, current the current policy approach will at best incorporate Ethiopians, Eritreans, and other immigrants into the Black and Ethnic minority population 1 as second-class members of society.
Looking back, looking forward: How Eritrean and Ethiopian immigrants see themselves today
How an individual comes to see her or himself is the outcome of many factors. Following
Mead, Barth and others, identity is the outcome of social interaction with others and is generated through social transactions that give rise to potentially flexible, situationally specific, and negotiable identities (Jenkins 1996) . One key element in the processual "He must be a Habesha, speaking my language (i.e. Amharic) … He has to be Christian as well." As a British citizen she has travelled to Ethiopia, an experience which she described as "strange, like, wow, it is going back to the future! Everything is different ...
." This reaction has given way to a sense that Ethiopia is where her "roots" are, and to an interest in learning Ethiopian languages though she has no intention of participating in Ethiopian RCOs. She intends to keep her British citizenship "because it is safe here." With a few exceptions, such as religious services which can be attended without fear of detection because everyone is Black, failed asylum seekers avoid public events.
These individuals also refuse to register with the Home Office for fear of being picked up and deported;, they tend to rely on friends or religious organiszations for support.
At some point, however, destitution or the obligation to care for family members drives individuals into the labour market. Several individuals we interviewed continued to use the National Insurance number or work permit they were issued on arrival to work, and they pay taxes. 12 A few individuals are married to British citizens or are supported by a British "friend", but when their work permit is revoked they lose their job. Thus "J", who was sacked after his work permit was revoked, told us I am out of a job and life is getting harder and harder. There is are no jobs except some temporary ones.… Sometimes for two or three days a week with low pay and sometimes you do not get even that … In order to keep myself busy I do some voluntary work.
While some failed asylum seekers use illegal or expired papers to earn money, there iwas no indication that Ethiopians or Eritreans bought buy or "rented" false identity documents. Indeed, the majority of those we spoke to were attempting to regularisze their immigration status. If they were in "regular" employment they paid taxes and National
Insurance contributions, and they attempted to renew work permits, driving licencses, etc.
Many were paying lawyers substantial sums to raise their case with the Home Office in the hope of legalising their stay, but in so doing they risked detection and arrest.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the experience of Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants who have arrived in the UK from the late 1960s onwards. Whereas other studies have focused on the "transnational social field" to examine the "connections" these immigrants have with their country of origin etc., we have focused on forms of ethnic organiszing to understand whether and how the experience of immigrants in the UK has indeed acted "as a kind of pivot which while anchored, pivots between a new land and transnational incorporation" (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004 : 1001 . In fact we have found a much more complex process than was envisaged by some authors.
The experience of the fifty thousand50,000 Ethiopians and Eritreans who currently reside in the UK has varied considerably over time. For many decades a principle focus of immigrant life was to establish and socialisze through RCOs in which shared ethnicity was the key organiszing principle; however, as larger numbers of refugees arrived from the Horn ethnicity proved an inadequate basis to organisze support for a much more diverse and, due to dispersal, more geographical fragmented population.
Immigrant organiszing between the late 1970s and today is marked by two constants. First, and in the absence of support by the British government, immigrants have had to rely upon each other by forming RCOs, associations, and churches to meet the material and social needs of their members. Second, the social and political context which confronted immigrants has had a decisive impact on the way they organiszed and on their ability to successfully settle and integrate into British society. While seeking asylum in the UK between 1960 and the early 1990s was relatively straightforward, the situation changed radically from the late 1990s when ever more restrictive asylum and immigration policies were introduced. The effect of an increasingly unwelcome reception contributed to the creation of RCOs which increasingly differentiated between individuals on ethnic, religious, and national lines rather than seeking to create bridges (social capital) between one another and with British communities.
In 2001 this form of immigrant organising was, following a major policy change which repudiated "multiculturalism" in favour of the idea of "social cohesion", seen as highly problematic. But rather than addressing the very real constraints which prevented immigrants from integrating, the government has opted for coercive integration policies England and which has been accompanied by social isolation, vulnerability, impoverishment and an inability to secure legal status.
Is the experience of Eritrean and Ethiopian immigrants in the UK one that can be generaliszed elsewhere? Such a conclusion is unlikely because, following Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) , it is clear that what is needed to answer this question is comparative national research on an immigrant population and their transnational social field in order to understand the limits of a single case study and to better understand how temporal changes here and there and across generations affects immigrant identity.
Finally it is worth noting that by adopting a transnational perspective we have been able to identify important contextually specific processes at work in the UK which have shaped the experience of settlement of Ethiopians and Eritreans, the form and extent of immigrant organiszational life, and their participation in a wider transnational social field. 4 The Saho are a small ethnic group which resides on the Eritrea-Ethiopian border. They were caught up in the liberation of Eritrea and were displaced during the 1998-2000
border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
5 Some religious organiszations seek to preserve the culture of their members by providing supplementary language classes for children in their "mother tongue".
6 Many RCOs had IT facilities -reportedly for "training" purposes -which were unused. 8 This vernacular term refers to individuals from Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea and is used to refer to the Amhara, Tigrayan"s and individuals from Tigre. Detractors of the current regime in Ethiopia use this term to disparage such groups.
9 There are regular protests outside the Ethiopian embassy and less regularly in response to visits by Eritrean politicians. 10 The current regime in Ethiopia has invested considerable efforts to encourage "the Diaspora" to return home and invest in the country with the result that tens of millions of dollars have been invested in key development projects in Ethiopia by US-based Ethiopians. In contrast, Eritrean embassies have put pressure on Eritrean immigrants to pay (an illegal) tax to Eritrea and to publicly demonstrate their support for the ruling party in Asmara.
11 Other female informants with a very similar social and family background created far more space within which to live in the UK which was linked to her fluency in English on arrival and to academic success in the UK.
